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This paper studies the effect of debt renegotiation on the design of optimal
loan arrangemeuts in a model of borrowing and lending with asymmetric informa-
tion. The optimal form of finance is a standard debt contract with a bankruptcy
clause that acts as a payment incentive. Debt renegotiation may occur because
bankruptcy involves costly asset liquidation which is ex-post inefficient. We show
I,hat, th~ i~xtenL of tbe entrepron~~ur's liabilil.ies in Lhi~ optimal Io:4n contract d~-
p~,nds upon the creditor's comiuitmi~nt tu iwposi~ bankruptcy shuuld defauh ever
occnr. If I hr crrditor is pr~~counnitc~d nol. tn for~;ive a.u,y portiun of tho outstandin};
d~.bl., a liiuit~~d liability arr:wtiom~,ul. is nptiui:~l. 'I'haL is d~,f:wlt shuuld outitl~~
the creditor to liquidate only the assets remaining from the project that has been
financed by the loan. In the absence of precommitment, however, the issuance of
debt may efficiently be secured in addition by the entrepreneur's personal wealth
outside the project.
Keywords: Debt Contracts, Renegotiation, Secured Lending.}
I Introduction
How cloes the prospect of future debt renegotiation affect the lender's security interests at
thc contracting date? We study this question in a simple model of borrowing and lending
with asymmetric information. A risk-neutral entrepreneur needs to raise capital for a
risky investment project. The project outcome, however, cannot directly be observed by
the creditors. The optimal loan arrangement is a debt contract with a bankruptcy clause
that acts as a payment incentive for the entrepreneur. The institution of bankrupty
allows the creditor to take possession oÍ some of the entrepreneur's assets in the event
of dcfault. We show that the extent of the entrepreneur's liabilities in the optimal loan
coutract depends upon the creditor's commitment to impose bankruptcy should default
ever occur. If the creditor is precommited not to forgive any portion of the outstanding
debt, a limited liability arrangement is optimaL This means that default should entitle
the creditor to liquidateonly the assets remaining from the project that has been financed
lry Lhe loau. In Lhe absence of precornmitrneuL, however, such limitation of liability may
no lunger be optimal. Instead, the íssuance o( debt may eí}'iciently be secured in addition
by thc cntrepreneur's pcrsoual wealth outsidc Lhe projecL.
Altlrough outside collateral increases the total amount of assets liquidated in the event
of bankruptcy, it may lower the expected dead-weight loss associated with inef~icient asset
liquiclation. We show that collateral requirements make it more likely that the initial
dcbt contract is renegotiated and some part of the debt forgiven in case the entrepreneur
dc~~ lar~~s hiuisclf uuable to pay his dcbt in full. IIy (avoring dcbt rcncgotiatiou colla.tcua.l
nu4y t.hus hclp avoiding an inc~fficicnt changc in project owncrship.
Ileuegotiation will occur when the borrower-lender relationship reaches a point wherc
the initial contract stipulates an ex-post inefficient outcome. Usually the creditor is less
~~(li~ i~~nt as rnanagcr of Lhc project's assa-ts Lhan is thc lrorrowcr so that bankruptcy insi,y
prove ex-post inefficient. "I'he contracting parties ~nay achieve a 1'areto-improvernent. by
writ.inh a nc~w ~untrac-t, undcr which t.hc~ c~nl.n~~,rc~neur inainL.rinx prujc"c~t own~rship al, u
rc"cluced debt IeveL The possibility of renegotiatiun i~uplies that default will uoL always
be penalized by bankruptcy and both parties to the loan realize Lhis. Knowing that thcrc
is a cliance of debt forgiveness, the borrower tnay falsely claim that tbe debt excceds Lhe
investment's return and that he is forced to default. This motive for cheating is weakened
whcn collateral has been posted. The higher the degree of collateralization, the more2
inclin~d is the creditor to believe that the project return actually is low when he observes
dcfaulL. Conscquently he finds the option of taking over the project less profitable in
co,nparison to forgiving a portion of the debt. In this way, outside collateral may reduce
tl,e~ expected cost oC bankruptcy. Its benefit is positively related to the size of the dead-
wcit;ht loss resulting froin projc~ct liyuidation. Fspecially high-risk finns will find il.
a~lv;,nl.at;,~nus Lu o(fc~r c~ollaLc~ral Lo Lhc~ir poL,~ntial c-rr,liturs.
A couviucing explanation of the existence of secured debt ~uuat demoustrate LhaL its
use may provide gains that exceed its costs.'~ If collateral merely redistributed wealth
between the borrower and lender in the event of default, other contractual devices that
avoid costly liquidation of collateralized assets, would prove advantageous. To compen-
sate the lender for the risk of default, firms would be better off by paying interest rates
that reflect their risk category instead of selling secured debt. The recent literature on
credit contracts with asymmetric information shows that this argument fails if the lender
knows less than the borrower about the investment's riskiness. In credit markets with
moral hazard or adverse selection outside collateral may serve as an incentive or screen-
ing device (see Besanko and Thakor (1987), Bester (1985, 1987), and Chan and Kanatas
(1985)). Outside collateral increases the punishment for default. Ií the borrower can
choose among a variety of projects with different riskiness, collateral enforces the selec-
tion of less risky projects. Similarly, as a response to adverse selection lenders may offer
a menu of contracts to sort loan applicants into risk categories. Entrepreneurs with low
prol,ability of default then revcal Lhcrosclves by accepting collatcral reyuirerncnts which
would be unaLLractive for high risks. In snnnnary, this literature predicts a negative~
relation between default risk and the amount of collateral. This prediction is opposite
to the conventional wisdom that high-risk firms have to issue security in order to attracL
crcdit.ors.2t
'I'o focus on the impact of renegotiation on the terms of the initial debt contract,
we consider a model where all parties have ex-ante symmetric information. The invest-
ment's return distribution and the entrepreneur's ability to pay his debt are not affected
bv the terms of the loan agreement. In contrast with the incentive or screening explana-
tion, we find that collateral is more likely to be used for financing high-risk investments.
Indeed, we conclude that renegotiation may seriously undermine the role of collateral as
a scrcrning device. Because also high-risk entrepreneurs find collateralization advanta-3
givnis, low-risk entrepreneurs may no longer be able to distinguish themselves by posting
collxtcral.
Our basic model is inspired by Gale and Ilellwig (1985) and Diamond (1984), who
derive debt contracts as optimal arrangements under asymmetric information about
project outcomes. Their analysis, however, presumes precommitment so that contracts
may in~lude ex-post inefficiencies that are common knowledge. Huberman and Kahn
(1988) study debt renegotiation in a model where borrower and lender have symmetric
information but return realizations are not verifiable. In this context, there is no ex-post
inefficient bankruptcy and the institution oí limited liability suf8ces to encourage the
entrepreneur to pay his debt. Hart and Moore (1989) show that debt renegotiation may
irivolve inefficient asset liquidation despite symmetric information. In their multi-period
model this may happen because the entrepreneur cannot commit credibly to pay a certain
amount of money in the future. Much of the literature on debt renegotiation deals with
the case of sovereign debt (see, e.g., Bulow and Rogoff (1989), Gale and Hellwig (1989),
and hernandez and Rothenthal (1988)). The basic assumption of this literature is that
there is no third party enforcement of contracts. 'I'his restricts Lhe possibility of secured
lending because in the event of default the creditor has at most limited access to the
borrower's assets.
'1'he remainder of this paper consists of four Sections. Section II presents an extensive
game ofcontract design and renegotiation. Section III studies the case of precommitment
as a point of reference. Optimal contracts in the absence of precommitment are analyzed
in Section IV. Section V concludes.
II The Basic Model
Consider a risk-neutral entrepreneur who is endowed with a project. The project
requires some fixed initial investment 1 and yields the random return X. With probability
0 C p c 1 the project is successful and the return realization is X,; if the project fails,
the rcturn is X~, with X, 1 X~ ~ 0.
The entrepreneur has no liquid funds to finance the investment. He raises the amount
I by issuing debt. As in Diamond (1984) or in Gale and Hellwig (1985), this form of
finance results from the assumption that borrower and ]ender have asymmetric informa-
tion. '[he entrepreneur observes the return realization at no cost. The creditor receives4
this information only after taking over the project. However, such a transfer of owner-
ship is costly. The creditor's valuation of the project return X is ~X, with 0 G a G I.
'I'he coat ( I- c:)X arises because the original entrepreneur has more ability to completc
the project or because monitoring and liquidating the project is costly Cor the creditor.
Altio wc~ will asaunre Lhat outsiders rernain uninfornu~d ahout Lhc project outcomc even
wh~~n the c reditur brcoincs owner uf t.hc, prujc~rt. Lc,t
(1) a[pX, t(1 - p)Xf] ~ I.
'I'his assumption ensures that financing the project is feasible even though information
is imperfect. The creditor's expected profit from making a loan can be made positive
simply by allowing him to foreclose on the project in the event of de.fault. Given Lhe
informational assumptions, the creditor and the entrepreneur will sign a standart debt
contract. Since return realizations are not verifiable to outsiders, the borrower's repay-
ment obligation R cannot be conditioned on the project outcome. To enforce payment
of R, the contract entitles the creditor to take over the project if the entrepreneur fails
to pay his debt.
Whilc thc cntreprcnc~ur has no liyuid fuuds, hc owus somc amouut W of collateraliz-
able wealth. This wealth cannot be used to finance investment directly, say because it
cou,ists of illiyuid assets, or it represents thc entreprencur's Cuturc income outside Lhe
project. Ilowever, the creditor may use W, or any Craction thereof, as collateral C for a
loan. The lender's and the borrower's valuation of C are not the same. Taking possession
of and liquidating C typically involves transaction costs. These costs will be represented
by a factor 1-(3, with 0 G~3 G 1, so that the creditor's valuation of C equals (iC.
Through collateralization the creditor can receive additional assets outside the project
which otherwise would not be legally attachable. A main focus of our analysis is to
investigate why it might be optimal to assign such a right to the creditor in the event of
default.3~
In what follows, we will assume
(2) I ~ W ~- X~.
As a result, making a loan exposes the creditor to the risk of default. Condition (2)
implies that in case of project failure the creditor cannot recover the amount I even
when he takes over all of the entrepreneur's assets. Therefore, the debt contract mustj
spe~ci(y a repayment ohligation R which the entrepreneur is able to mc~et only in the
c'ase~ of success. Indr~erd, the creditor's expected payoff would be negative as long as
R C W f X~. As a further implication, the constraint C C W limits the use of collateral
as a means to enforce repayment. Because R~ W-~ X~, the successful entrepreneur
would rather pay X~ and give up his wealth W than pay R. Some models of the credit
market assume that the borrower repays his loan only if the value of the collateral exceeds
his debt (see,, e.g., Barro (1976) and Benjamin (1978)). Assumption (2) rules out this
inotive for cotlateralization. In our model, the creditor's right to foreclose on the project
is essential for giving the borrower an incentive to pay his debt.
In summary, the debt contract I' -(R, C) obliges the entrepreneur to pay the amount
R; failure to fulfill this obligation entitles the creditor to take over the project and
the collateral C C W. The contract I' employs the threat of bankruptcy to induce the
suc'cessful entrepreneur to pay R even though the creditor is unable to observe the project
return. This threat, however, may commit the parties to an inefficient outcome. In the
case of project failure it implies the dead-weight cost (1- a)X~ f(1- ~i)C. Therefore the
creditor may wish to renegotiate the original contract Iand to forgive some part of the
debt after the entrepreneur announces project failure. If actually Lhe project has failed,
hc~ would maximize his payoff by rnaking the take-iL-or-leave-it offer 0 -(X~, C) which
recluces the firm's debt to X~ and makes the creditor owuer of the collateralized assets C.
Accepting this proposal leaves the entrepreneur no worse o(f because the original contract
allows the creditor to take possession of the project and the collateral C. While contract
reuegotiation oí this kind may avoid an inef6cient allocation of project ownership, it
has a negative impact on the successíul entrepreneur's incentives to pay his debt. If he
preLcnds projecL failure and the creditor coucedes to renegotiate, he gains R- X~ - C.
To analyze borrower and lender behavior in such a situation we will adopt the following
stylized game of contract design and renegotiation. In the first game stage, potential
creditors compete by offering contracts of the form I' -(R, C). For completeness, each
creditor also has the option of not making an offer, which ensures him a profit of zero.
If in the second stagc the finn finds none of the contracts acceptable, the game ends and
all parties get zero payoff. Otherwise the entrepreneur undertakes the investment by
accepting the offer of one of the creditors. All other would-be creditors receive a payoff
of zrro. In stage three the entrepreneur observes the realization of X. The creditors
canuot observe it. [f X~ G R G X, only the successful entrepreneur can pay R. "I'hus
after observiug X~, the entreprenerir is forced to default in stage four. In the event of
success he has two choices: He can make his debt payment or he can c{aim project failure
and clefault. Iie chooses a possibly mixed strategy so that he defaults with probability
(l c rl G 1 and pays R with probability 1- d. In the event o( repayment the game euds
with payoffs R- 1 aud X, -!i! for the creditor and entrepreneur, respectively. Otherwise
t.hi~ game ends iu stage five in which the creditor either imposes baukruptcy or u(fers
the uew contracL 0- (JC~,C). Again we allow for random strategies and 0 G b G 1
denotes the probability of bankruptcy. In the case of bankruptcy the creditor takes over
the project so that his payoff is either aX, f pC - 1 or nX~ f QC - !, depending upon
the entrepreneur's type. The entrepeneur's payoff equals -C. By contract renegotiation
t.he creditor ensures himself a payoff of X~ f~C - !; the entrepreneur's payoff from
~ depends upon his type and is X, -.X~ - C and -C given the return X, and X~,
respectively.
This simplified game gives the credit,or two options in the event of default: He can
either exercise his right to foreclose on the debtor's assets or forgive a portion of the
debt. Of course, the renegotiation procedure could be modeled by a more complicated
bargaining game with asymmetric iníormation. Our specification, however, makes the
analysis rnore tractable; in particular it generates a uniyue cquilibrium in Lhe subgamc
following the realiaation of X. Also, we are confident that our results continue to hold
iu extended versions oï the present model.
An interesting point is that even the renegotiated contract 0 involves costly liqui-
datiou of the entrcpreneur's outsicíe assets as long as the original contract I' cntails
colíateral requirements. The reason is that after project failure the debtor has no liquid
funds in excess of X~ to compensate the creditor for a reduction in C. A Pareto-improving
muve which avoids the cost (1 - Q)C is not feasible. The debtor's liquidity constraint
may thus result in an inefTicient liquidation of assets. This phenomenon appears to be a
typical characteristic of debt renegotiation and has been observed in a different context
by Aghion and Bolton (1988) and Hart and Moore ( 1989).7
III Optïmal Contracts without Renegotiation
First, we want to take a look at the contracting problem in the absence of debt
renegotiation. We thus study the subgame-períect equilibrium of the game described
in the forgoing Section under the exogenous restriction b- I. This serves to illustrate
the relation between renegotiation and collateralization. It should not suggest that the
creditors would prefer to commit themselves not to renegotiate if they had the means
for such a commitment. The question of whether ex ante commitment of this kind is
actually desirable will be addressed in Section IV.
Note that our description of debt contracts precludes the use of random devices. The
creditor's right in the event of default is deterministic; he cannot impose bankruptcy with
some contractually specified probability. As noted by Townsend (1979) and Mookerjee
and Png (1989), stochastic auditing may be pre[erable in situations with costly moni-
toring of income realizations so that the assumption of deterministic contracts may be
restrictive. Loan contracts specifying a random allocation of ownership rights, however,
are hardly observed in reality. As a theoretical justification we assume that random de-
vices are not verifiable so that stochastic outcomes are not contractible. It is important
to bear in mind that as a result of this assumption the initial contract is incomplete.
When the creditor always uses his right Lo foreclose on the debtor's assets in the event
of default, the successful entrepreneur is better off by paying his debt as long as R G X,.
Commitment not to forgive any part of the debt constitutes a strong enforcement mech-
anism which induces the entrepreneur to reveal his type truthfully. As in Ga1e and
Hellwig (1985), the threat of bankruptcy serves to satisfy incentive-compatibility condi-
tions which make sure that the entrepreneur tells the truth for each return realization.
Isuforcing truth-Lelling behavior, however, has its cost. With probal~ility 1- p projecl.
uwn~~rtihip docs uot rest with tbc ent.repr~,nrur. "}'hi~ following msult dcals wif.h thi~
opti~nality of collateralization in this situation.
Proposition 1: Assume that creditors are commited not to forgive any debl so thal
b- I. Then in equálibrium a loan contracl I" is signed which salisfies C" - 0.
Proof: As a result of competition ín stage 1, I" maximizes the entrepreneur's expected
payoff subject to the lenders' break-even constraint. Define R' by
(3) pR~ -f (I - p)aXI - I.Then (1) implies R' G X, so that the successful entrepreneur with contract I' -(R',0)
optimally chcxises d' - 0 in stage four. Cons~~quently Lhe Iender's expected payo(f from
propusing r' is zero and the entrcprencur's expected payoff is
(4) P(-X~ - R~) - PX, f(1 - P)aX; - I~ 0.
Now consider any other contract Iwhich gives positive expected payoffs to the firm.
Then R G X, again implies d- 0 so that the lender breaks even if
(5) pR f(1 - p)(aX~ f QC) - I.
Given (5), the entrepreneur's profit írom I' equals
(6) P(X. - R) - (1 - P)C -
pX, f(1 - P)(aX~ -(1 - Q)C) - 1 G p(X, - R').
This proves that any contract Iwith C~ 0 is suboptimal and that in equilibrium the
project is financed by I". Q.E.D.
Collateral cannot improve efficiency if bankruptcy occurs solely as a result of project
failure. In Lhis case it only increases the dead-weight cost of the change in firm owner-
ship. For collateral to become efíective, it must have an impact upon the equilibrium
probability of bankruptcy. As we shall see, this may happen when debt renegotiation is
possible.
IV Renegotiation and the Optimality of Collateral
In the absence of precommitment the appropriate solution concept for the contracting
game is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This basically extends the subgame perfect
equilibrium by requiring that in the final game stage the creditor's decision has to be
optimal given his information, where posterior probabilities are obtained by updating
priors according to Bayes' rule. When default occu;s, the creditor remains uninformed
about the project outcome. From Bayes' rule the posterior probability that X, has been
realized is
pd
(7) ~(d) - pd f 1 - pbecause the successful entrepreneur defaults with probability d.
As a first step towards investigating the features of equilibrium contracts we consider
the subgame following the realizatron of X. Suppose a loar, has been made. In addition,
let X~ t W C R G X,. The motivation for the first inequality is that a contract with
R G X~ -}- W would not allow the lender to break-even because of (2). Clearly the
precommitment solution studied in the foregoing Section ís inconsistent with sequential
rationality. As the entrepreneur reacts to b- 1 by setting d- 0, Bayesian updating
requires the creditor to conclude that the project has failed when he observes de.fault.
Given this in(ormation, however, imposing bankruptcy is suboptimal because the payoff
from renegotiating I' is higher by the amount (1 - a)X~.
'1'he perfectness requirement precludes the use of incredible threats to enforce repay-
ment. 'I'he equilibrium then prescribes the parties to adopt random strategies in stages
four and five. Indeed, we already have seen that b- 1 can no longer be part of an
equilibriurn path. A similar argurnent reveals that b- 0 cannot represent equilibrium
Lrh.~.~irtr i~ithr~r. In~lee,rl, knowinq ih;it i.hc~ r~r~~~litor will ~'o~~~'r~~1~~ Ic~ ~~n Lh~ finnl sta.g~~,
thr~ auccr~snful r~ntrepri~ui~ur n~spuuds Ly dcfaull. as .~", - I( G X, - X~ - C. IiuL {;ivcn Lhr
postcrior probability a(d) - rr(1) - p, tht, c~rcditor prcfcrs liquidatiun of Lhc Irorruwr~r's
project to the reduced debt payment X~ because a~pX, ~- (1 - p)X~] ~ X~ by (1) and
(2). This leaves 0 G 6 G 1 as the remaining candidate for equilibrium. Accordingly, the
creditor must be indifferent about imposing bankruptcy or proposing 0. This is the case
if
(8) a[a(d)X, f (1 - n(d))XI] - XI.
Given the lender's behavior, the successful entrepreneur's expected payoff from defaulting
is (1-6)(X, -X~)-C. He loses the collateral C but with probability (1-6) he maintains
ownership of the firm by paying the reduced debt X~. It follows from (8) that 0 G d C 1
and so also the borrower randomizes after observing X- X,. For him to be indifferent
bet.wcwn default and repayment, it must be the case that
X,-R-(1-b)(X,-X~)-C.
Solving ec{uations (8) and (9) for d and 6, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 2: Assume lhat the projecl has Gecn jinanccrl by a loarr I' with X~ ~- W G
R G.ï,. Then the equilibrium in the subgame following the realizatiora oJ X is unique10
and is given by
d,-(1-P)(1-o)X~ b,-R-Xt-C
P(oXa - X~) X, - Xf .
An interesting feature of the equilibrium is that, in contrast with the case of precom-
mitment, the firm's repayment behavior no longer reveals its private informatian abaut
the project outcome. As 0 c d' C 1, there is partial pooling so that the creditor is not
precisely informed about the true return realization when he observes default. This is
similar to observations by Dewatripont (1989), Hart and Tirole (1988), and Laffont and
Tirole (1988), who conclude that the possibility of renegotiation favors the use of mixed
strategies and reduces the degree of information revelation.
E'roposition 2 indicates why in the absence of precommitment it may be desirable to
inchrde collateral requirements in the loan contract. Increasing C has a dual impact on
thr projcv'1.'s ovcvall prufitability. On the onc óand it crcatcs au additional dc,ad-wci};hl.
loss because the entrepreneur's valuation of C exceeds the lender's valuation. Ou thc
other hand, 6' and thereby the probability of an inefFicient change in project ownership
is lowered. Which of these effects dominates the other depends upon the relative costs
expressed by the factors ~ and ~3. Define
Q -
op(Xs - XI) - (1 - o)X!
(10) np(Xa - X~) ~
Note that 0 G f3 c 1. Moreover, ~3 and cr are positively related and Q tends to unity
when o approaches one.
Proposition 3: IJ Q~ Q, then in equilibrium a debt contract I" is signed such that
C' - W. Otherwise it is optinaal to set C' - 0.
Proof: Ily ( 1) and (2), no creditor will o(G~r a contract with li e X~ f W. Whcn a.
coutract 1' with It ~ X~ -~ W is sigued, Nropoaition 'L applies aud so the creditor receives
the payment R with probability p(1 -d'). When default occurs he is indifferent between
bankruptcy and renegotiation. Therefore, with probability pd' f 1- p the creditor
receives the payoff Xt ~- ~3C - I. Accordingly, for I' to be individually rational for the
creditor, it has to be the case that
(il) n(i -d`)Rf (pd' f ) -n)(X~fQC)? 1.
The entrepreneur's payoffis -C when the project fails; otherwise he is indifferent between
defaulting and paying R. Therefore, his expected payoff from signing I' is given as p(X, -11
R) -(1 - p)C. As a result of creditor competition, the constraint (11) must be Fiineiing
in ec{uilibrium so that substituting R from ( I 1) yields
( tz) P(-~~, -!t) - l l- P)c- -




Thus maximizing the entrepreneur's payoff with respect to C subject ot 0 G C G W
implics C` - W if (pd' ~- 1 - p)(1 - Q) G d'. Using the valuc oC d' irom Proposition
`l, this coudition is easily seen to be equivalent to f3 ~ Q. Of course, C' - 0 solves Lhe
maximization problem if 13 G Q. Q.L:.D.
Whether posting collateral is optimal depends upon the size of the entrepreneur's
comparative advantage to own and manage thc firm. For a given value of the parameter
j3, the gains from collateralization are the higher the lower the value of a. This is means
collateral becomes useful when the costs of ]iquidating the firm are sufficiently high.
When project ownership is irreleva,nt as a gces to one, collateral requirements turn out
to be suboptimal.
The relation between project risk and the equilibrium contract ptovides another in-
teresting insight. To investigate this relationship, we define the parameter
(1 - ~)XI
tr - (1 - 11)cr(X, - X7)
Iutipcction of (]0) and (l'3) shows that ,9 ~ Q if and only if p G p.~l `I'his leads to a
simplc Corrolary of Proposition 3:
Proposition 4: Ij p G p, then in equilibrium a debt contract I" is signed such that
C` - W. Othermise it is optimal to set C' - 0.
'1'hc resulL has thc following intuition. "1'hc prospect of dcLt rcucgotiation uo longcr
induces truthtelling behavior on the part of the entrepreneur. In this situation the
intention of collateral agreements is not to punish for project failure but to make default.
less attractive in the event of success. As Proposition `l shows, the equilibrium likelihood
of dishonesty d' is inversely related to the project's success probability p. Therefore a
higher success rate makes it more likely that the entrepreneur will lose his outside assets
because o( project failure rather than because of the attempt to cheat. As a consequence,
collateral is more effective with a high risk of project failure.12
Interestingly, the conclusion of Proposition 4 is in direct contrast with the signaling
theory of collateral, as developed in Besanko and Thakor (1987), Bester (1985, 1987),
and Chan and Kanatas (1985). These models predict a positive relation between the
investment's success probability and the degree of collateralization. The underlying as-
sumption is that the creditors are less informed about project risks than the entrepreneur.
Different contracts are then used to sort loan applicants into risk classes. Entrepreneurs
who are more likely to succeed are inclined to post a higher amount of collateral be-
cause they are less likely to lose it in the event of project failure. In equilibrium low-risk
entrepreneurs choose debt contracts with low repayment obligations and high collat-
eral requirements whereas high-risk entrepreneurs sign contracts with high repayment
obligations and low collateral reyuirements.
I~ inally we turn to the question of wlrethcr precomrnitnrcnt not Lo rencgotiate Lhe.
original contract I" increases social welfare. One way of preventing debt renegotiation
is to employ the aid of third parties, as suggested by Schelling ( 1960): The creditor
signs a contract with an outsider agreeing to pay a large sum of money should he ever
forgive any portion of the debt. Of course, for such a scheme to work, the outsider must
be incorruptible because otherwise he could be bribed into permitting renegotiation if
the debt contract prescribes an ex-post inefficient liquidation of assets. Alternatively,
precommitment may be enforced by reputational considerations. The concern for long-
run reputation effects may induce the creditor not to forgive the debt if this is optimal
ex-ante, even though it may be suboptimal ex-post. In what follows, we do not want to
investigate the feasibility but rather the desirability of precommitment. In other words,
we compare the dead-weight loss associated with bankruptcy in the two categories of
equilibrium analyzed in the foregoing and the present Section, respectively.
The possibility of renegotiation affects the expected cost of bankruptcy in two ways.
1''irtit,, ~Icfaull. is Icss frcyucutly (olluwccl Iry prujrc L liyuidatiun as L' C I. 'I'his posit.ivc~
e(feca, is even enlarged when setting C' - W is optinial. Second, defaiilt occcu~s nion~
often because Lhe entreprcncur may seek to chcaL. ludced, in thc eyuilibrium describccl
by Proposition 2 the probability of default is pd' -~ 1 - p compared with 1 - p if b- 1.
'1'his effect is especially harmful because in some cases the successful project is liqui-
dated. Note that competition reduces the creditor's expected profits to zero in any
equilibrium. There[ore, the entrepreneur's expected payoff is critical for evaluating thewelfare implications of precommitment.
Proposition 5: The entrepreneur's ezpected payo,(j is higher in the equilibrium wheT~e
renegotiutioa is possible than in the equilibriurn with precommitrraent nol to renegotiate.
Proof: The entrepreneur's equilibrium payoff in the two categories of e.quilibrium is given
by (9) and (12), respectively. Suppose, contrary to the Proposition, that the expression
in (12) does not exceed the expression in (4). Because C is chosen to maximize (12),
this implies
(14) (pá"tl-p)X~-1 c(1-d')((1-p)aX~-1).
Using (7) and (8), it fol}ows that (14) is equivalent to
(15) a(pd'Xa f(1 - P)XI) c Í1 - d')(1 - p)aX7 - d'1.
BuL (15) implies a(pX, f(1 -p)X~) C I, a contradiction to assumption (1). This provcs
Lhat the Proposition must hold. Q.E.D.
It is important for this result that Che initial contract ia iu~o.nplcie ;n i,rat it.
does not allow for randomization. If stochastic debt forgiveness were contractible, the
'renegotiation-proofness' principle would apply which implies that the absence of com-
mitmcnL lowcrs welfare. Proposition 5 is an example demonstrating that this principle
may fail to hold when contracts are incomplete. As a result, we may expect to ob-
serve debt renegotiation in practice even when the creditors have the means to commit
themselves not to forgive any debt. Competition among lenders does not favor elim-
inating the prospect of renegotiation. Yet, one should regard this implication of our
model with caution. In particular the assumption that the contracting parties have sym-
me~f,ric in(orrnation about the project's return characteristics scerns important. Whcn
the cntrcpreneur kuows urore about. Lhe projcct's ex-ante pro}it:Lbility Lliat LLe credilur,
renegotiation may in fact be harmful. Adverse selection may occur when the creditor
cannot commit to liquidating inefficient firms in the future. Dewatripont and Maskin
(1989) discuss this aspect in a model where the creditors would like to commit ex-ante
against refinancing in order to deter entrepeneurs from starting bad projects.
Our discussion of the conflict between Proposition 4 and the signaling motive for
collateral indicates another reason why renegotiation may lead to adverse selection. In
the absence of renegotiation entrepreneurs with good projects can distinguish themselves14
from those with bad projects by posting more collateral. But, Proposition 4 shows that
also the high-risk entrepreneurs will find it advantageous to offer collateral when there
is a chance of renegotiation. This means that renegotiation may preclude a separating
equilibrium where collateral serves as a screening device. Good and bad projects will
then be pooled and, as showrr by De Meza and Webb (1987), the equilibrium will have
a tendency towards a higher level of aggregate investment than is socially optimal.
V Conclusion
"Chis paper investigates how the prospect of future debt renegotiation affects the
lender's security interests at the contracting date. The terms of the initial debt contract
play a strategic role in the development of the borrower-lender relationship; indirectly
they determine the likelihood of renegotiation and the terms of the renegotiated con-
tract. Renegotiation occurs because the absence oí precommitment precludes incredible
bankruptcy threats. As a result, there is a chance that the creditor responds to default
by forgiving some part of the debt rather than by imposing bankruptcy. This in turn
influences the borrower's default decision. In our model the creditor cannot distinguish
whether the borrower defaults voluntarily or whether he is actually unable to meet his
payment obligations. The chance of debt forgiveness may induce the borrower to falsely
report that the investment's return ís to low to pay the full amount of debt.
We show that these circumstances favor the issuance of debt which is secured by
outside assets. The event of default entitles the creditor to liquidate the borrower's
collateralized wealth in addition to the assets remaining from the investment project.
Although outsidF collatc~ral incrc~ases the tot.al amount of asscts liquidatcd in the casf~
uf hankrul~t~,y, pc~rhaps surl,riaingly il. inay x~ t.iuilly luwi.r IJu~ ~~xl,i~c tc~l ~li~a~l wi~it;lit lu,ti
a,,~~riat~~~l wit.h axn~~l. li~tni~l:~l.iun. 'I'h~~ m:c~~ni iv LhaL cull:Lt~~raliral.iun n.~luc rv t.hi~ ~I~~btui'v
mot.ives for voluntary dcfaulL ao that baukruptcy is likely to occur. Wc show Lhat this
effect is especially relevant ïor high-risk investment projects. '1'herefore, such firms arc
more likely to be financed through loans that include collateral requirements than low-
risk firms.
While debt renegotiation may simply be interpreted as resulting from the creditor's
inability to precommit himself, we find that renegotiation may in fact increase welfare.
This provides an efficiency explanation of why debt renegotiation is frequently observedi :,
in practict~. We are careful, however, to point out that our assumption of ex-ante syrn-
metric information is essential for this result.is
Footnotes
1. Schwartz (1981) gives a critical review of explanations of the existence of secured
debt.
'l. "I'his view is empirically supported by Leeth and Scott's (1989) analysis of small
business loans.
a. In prinr.iplc, a cunl.ract cocild t.rausfe~r som~ of the cutrepreneur's illiquid asscl.s
iudependently of whether 6c fulfills his repaymcut obligatiou or not. lt is casy to
see, however, that such an arrangement would be suboptimal if (i G 1.
4. Note that p G p is consistent with assumption (1) unless (1 -~3)I ~(1 - Qa)X~.
If p 1 1, Proposition 4 simply says that setting C' - W is always optimal.17
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